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Equity prices as leading indicators: 
the Asian experience 
Kenneth N Kuttner 
Introduction 
Formulating monetary policy inevitably requires making predictions about the economy. This 
has become increasingly true as central banks have moved away from policies based on the 
management of intermediate targets (e.g., money or exchange rates) and toward frameworks 
defined in terms of the ultimate policy objectives (i.e., output and inflation targets), using 
indicators or information variables to guide policy toward those objectives.
1 This shift is most 
explicit in inflation targeting (IT) regimes since, as emphasized by Svensson (1997), 
forecasts of output and inflation are essential ingredients in the implementation of IT – and 
publishing those forecasts is de rigueur for inflation targeters. While less explicit, economic 
forecasts are also central to the policy process of central banks that do not formally adhere to 
IT, such as the US Federal Reserve. 
With monetary policy becoming increasingly forecast-based, the search for useful leading 
economic indicators has intensified. Much attention has been focused on the prices of assets 
such as stocks and bonds – including a variety of indicators derived from bond yields, such 
as the slope of the yield curve and risk spreads. There are good reasons to seek to extract 
information from asset prices: to the extent that they are forward-looking, they will reflect new 
information before it becomes incorporated into the macro data. 
The focus of this paper is on the price of equities, which, in the case of the United States, 
has been seen as an important, but somewhat unreliable, leading indicator. While the stock 
price is included in the index of leading economic indicators published by the Conference 
Board, econometric analyses, such as those of Stock and Watson (1989, 2001), suggest it is 
not particularly helpful in out-of-sample forecasting exercises.
2 In recent years, however, 
stock market movements in the United States appear to have tracked macroeconomic 
fluctuations relatively closely, raising the possibility of a closer connection between the two. 
In particular, the boom of the late 1990s, the recession of 2001, and the period of robust 
growth that began in 2004 all appear to have been led by a corresponding movement in 
stock prices – and, at least until interrupted by the late-summer subprime mortgage crisis in 
the United States, record stock market gains seemed to point to continued economic 
expansion. 
Similar observations could be made about equity prices among emerging market economies 
in Asia, where the spectacular gains enjoyed since 1998 (following the even more 
spectacular losses during the financial crises of 1997–98) have coincided with a period of 
rapid economic expansion. As shown in Figure 1, stock prices in much of emerging Asia 
have recovered most of the ground lost in 1997–98, with Korean equity prices even 
surpassing their previous peak. Stock prices have risen especially rapidly since 2003, even 
in Indonesia and the Philippines, where equity markets were very slow to recover from the 
crisis. 
                                                  
1  See Friedman (1990) for a thorough review of the targets, instruments, and indicators of monetary policy. 
2  An old joke among forecasters is that “stock prices have successfully forecast eight of the past five 
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Indeed, the sharp rise in stock prices has been viewed with alarm by some observers. One 
oft-stated fear is that the surge in the price of equities (and other assets, such as real estate) 
has been driven by some combination of over-borrowing and “excess liquidity” in the financial 
system, and that these factors will eventually contribute to another financial crisis. Collyns 
and Senhadji (2002), among others, have documented how such a process contributed to 
the crisis of 1997. 
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the information content of 
equity prices for a set of Asian economies. The primary focus of the analysis will be on the 
forecasting power of stock prices for real output growth and inflation. A secondary goal will 
be to determine the extent to which increases in equity prices (including the most recent rise) 
can be interpreted as a symptom of “excess liquidity”. 
The scope of the paper is intentionally narrow. It does not claim to be a systematic analysis 
of  all plausible financial leading indicators, along the lines of Stock and Watson (2001). 
Conspicuously absent, for example, are long-term interest rates (or the yield spread), which 
have been found to be highly informative in the US context.
3 With liquid long-term bond 
markets a relatively recent development in many countries, however, data limitations 
preclude a rigorous quantitative analysis of indicators such as the yield spread.
4 Nor does 
the paper address the question of whether the monetary authority should respond to asset 
price fluctuations, independent of those fluctuations’ implications for future macroeconomic 
outcomes.
5 
In its motivation and objectives, this paper is most similar to that of Mauro (1989), which 
examined the forecasting properties of equity prices for a large group of both developing and 
developed economies. There are a number of important differences, however: the present 
paper uses more recent data and focuses specifically on the emerging Asian experience, 
including two countries (Thailand and Indonesia) that did not appear in Mauro’s analysis. 
Other differences are the inclusion in this paper of other financial indicators (such as interest 
rates and monetary aggregates), an analysis of stock prices’ predictive power with respect to 
inflation, and an assessment of out-of-sample forecasting performance. In addition, this 
paper also examines the possible importance of “liquidity” growth in explaining stock price 
appreciation. A number of recent papers have examined this hypothesis in other contexts, 
including Baks and Kramer (1999), Gouteron and Szpiro (2005), and Rüffer and Stracca (2006). 
To preview: the findings presented in section 1 show that stock prices are a reasonably good 
leading indicator for real output growth for Malaysia and Korea, and to a slightly lesser 
extent, Thailand. The improvement in out-of-sample forecasting performance is marginal, 
however, even in those countries where the in-sample relationship is strong. An analogous 
set of results is presented for inflation in section 2, the main conclusion of which is that stock 
prices contain virtually no information relevant for predicting inflation. Section 3 explores the 
connection between “liquidity” and stock prices. No evidence of a connection (at least in a 
forecasting sense) between “liquidity” and stock price fluctuations emerges from the analysis; 
nor is there a connection between (a proxy for) “excess global liquidity” and output or stock 
prices. In Korea and Malaysia, there has been a tendency for stock price changes to precede 
changes in liquidity, defined as narrow monetary aggregates – but this may reflect the effects 
of stabilization policy during the 1997–98 period. 
                                                  
3  See, for example, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991). 
4  The Bank for International Settlements (2006) recently published a comprehensive overview of the 
development of bond markets in Asia. 
5  A large and still somewhat unsettled literature has grown up around this question: see, for example, Bernanke 
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1.  Stock prices and real output 
Aside from their visibility and availability, there are several scenarios in which equity prices 
might contain information that would be useful, in the context of a simple macroeconomic 
model, for forecasting real output. First, an increase in (expected future) productivity 
(e.g.,  from a favorable supply shock) would tend to increase the stock price and output. 
Second, as discussed in more detail below, policy-induced interest rate reductions will, at 
least over some horizon, tend to increase (expected future) profits, while reducing the 
discount rate applied to those earnings; both will raise equity values, while the rate reduction 
itself will lead to an expansion in output. Third, equity prices should also contain information 
about other, non-monetary demand shocks, such as fiscal policy – but because the effect of 
the interest rate on equity values would work in the opposite direction from the profit effect, 
the net impact is a priori ambiguous. A particularly attractive feature of equity prices (as well 
as other indicators based on prices determined in financial markets) is that they are forward-
looking, and incorporate information about fundamental shocks well before they have an 
effect on macroeconomic prices or quantities. This property may be especially useful in an 
emerging market context, where timely macroeconomic data are often not available. 
The baseline analysis involves quarterly data for real output and a measure of equity prices. 
Industrial production (or alternatively, manufacturing output) is used as the gauge of real 
output. (Ideally, it would be desirable to use a broader measure of output, but the availability 
of real GDP data is more limited.) The MSCI/Barra country index is used as the gauge of 
stock prices. Also included in the analysis are a number of additional indicators: the 
exchange rate, the short-term interest rate, and various measures of money or credit 
(i.e.,  “liquidity”). Except for the stock price, all national data are available from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). However, in some 
cases a longer or more complete time series was available directly from national sources, 
such as central banks. The series for global liquidity is that of Rüffer and Stracca (2006), and 
was obtained directly from the authors. A complete description of data sources can be found 
in the Appendix to this paper. 
The analysis of emerging market data can present certain challenges, and the present 
exercise is no exception. One common problem is that many of the series – especially 
industrial production and the monetary aggregates – are characterized by jumps or 
discontinuities introduced by methodological or definitional changes. Fortunately, such 
discontinuities are relatively easy to detect (many are flagged in the IFS database) and 
correct using suitable level adjustments. In the case of Indonesia, several observations on 
industrial production from 1997 and 1999–2000 are simply missing, and there is no 
alternative but to leave these as missing values. Data availability is also an issue. In this 
case, the main constraint is the MSCI stock price series, which begin in December of 1987. 
Figure 2 plots the four-quarter growth rates (in percentage terms) of equity prices and output 
for the five Asian economies covered by the analysis, plus the United States. The plots 
reveal a number of interesting patterns, and also some important differences across 
countries. Perhaps most notable is the strong co-movement between stock price and output 
fluctuations in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. (In annual data, the contemporaneous 
correlations of log differences are 0.40 and 0.55 for Korea and Thailand, but only 0.12 for 
Malaysia.) The high degree of correlation in these countries contrasts with the much weaker 
relationship observed for Indonesia and the Philippines, where the correlation coefficients are 
only 0.19 and −0.07. The US data make for an interesting comparison: here, the link between 
output and stock prices appears quite strong during some episodes, such as the 2001 
recession, but markedly less so in others. Overall, the correlation coefficient is 0.38. 
A high degree of correlation is not sufficient to make the stock price an informative leading 
indicator, of course. The crucial additional requirement is that stock price movements 
precede output fluctuations. Although this is a rather subtle feature to discern from the plots, 
the link between the two series seems to be nearly contemporaneous for the three countries 170  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
in which a strong correlation is observed. In Korea and Malaysia, there do appear to be some 
instances in which the stock price leads output by a few months; however, comparable 
episodes are not evident in the Thai data. Again, a comparison with the United States is 
revealing: here, sharp stock price movements clearly signaled many of the turning points of 
the 1970s and 1980s with a lead of many months. Stock prices failed to anticipate the 2001 
recession, however, and the overall level of equity prices did not decline significantly until the 
downturn was already underway. 
Forecasting regressions are a simple but useful tool for gauging the information content of 
leading indicators, such as stock prices. The baseline regression used to assess the 
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where  y is the log of real output, s is the log of the equity price index (deflated by the 
consumer price index), and the qi are quarterly dummies included to capture the strong 
pattern present in many of the series, particularly real output. Since equation (1) corresponds 
to the output equation from a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR), tests for the exclusion of 
the Δs terms can be interpreted as tests for Granger causality from stock prices to output.
6 
Specifications similar to (1) which are commonly used in forecasting applications implicitly 
incorporate important assumptions about the series’ time series properties. Specifically, it is 
assumed that the logs of real output and the real stock price are both integrated of order 1, 
and that the two series are not cointegrated. If the data were trend stationary, first 
differencing would produce a misspecified model whose forecasting performance would be 
impaired by the failure to incorporate trend reversion. Similarly, if a cointegrating relationship 
existed between the variables, forecasting performance would be improved by the inclusion 
of an error correction term. 
Fortunately, a preliminary analysis of the data shows that difference stationarity is an 
appropriate assumption for industrial production and stock prices: only for Korean industrial 
production does the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test reject the null of non-stationarity. (As 
noted below, however, using linearly detrended industrial production for Korea dos not alter 
the results.) Engle-Granger cointegration tests similarly fail to reject the null of no 
cointegration between the two variables. Thus, the differenced specification (1) is reasonably 
appropriate for the data used in the analysis. 
In assessing the information content of stock prices at a slightly longer horizon, a similar 
equation was used to forecast four-quarter-ahead output growth as a function of lagged four-
quarter output growth, and the one-quarter change in the stock price,  
−− − Δ= α + β Δ ≡+ Δ −γ + 44 4 4 4 t t tt tt yy s yy e . (2) 
Note that both specifications assume output and the price level are integrated of order one, 
and neither incorporates the possibility of cointegration between (the levels of) real stock 
prices and real output. 
The results from estimating equations (1) and (2) for each of the five Asian economies, plus 
the United States, are given in Table 1. The results generally confirm the impressions 
gleaned from Figure 2: at least on an in-sample basis, stock prices have a great deal of 
predictive power for real output in Korea and Malaysia, and to a slightly lesser extent, in 
                                                  
6  By reducing the amount of idiosyncratic “noise” inevitably present in any one indicator, factor methods, such 




7 For all three of these countries, the sum of the four γi coefficients in (1) is highly 
significant, as is the sole γ in specification (2). (The estimates are reported in the top line of 
the table, and the associated p-values in italics on the second line.) Moreover, the estimated 
coefficients are consistent with an economically significant relationship, with a 10 percent 
downturn in stock prices implying a 1 to 2 percent decline in industrial production. For 
Thailand, the exclusion restriction is not rejected at the 10 percent level, suggesting a slightly 
less statistically robust relationship. Consistent with the plots in Figure 2, the γ stock price 
coefficients are statistically insignificant for the Philippines and Indonesia, regardless of 
which specification is used. The strong results for Korea and Malaysia are broadly consistent 
with those for the United States, where the stock price terms are highly significant in 
forecasting regressions estimated over the same sample period.
8 
Having established some degree of forecasting ability, for at least a subset of the countries 
being analyzed, a natural question to ask is whether stock prices have any additional 
predictive power over and above that contained in other financial indicators, such as interest 
rates or monetary aggregates. An answer in the affirmative would strengthen the case for 
using the stock price as an information variable for monetary policy, while an answer in the 
negative would indicate that using the alternative financial indicator (or indicators) is more 
informative. 
A straightforward way to assess the marginal information content of equity prices is simply to 
include alternative indicators (represented by the variable x) in the two forecasting equations 
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As in Friedman and Kuttner (1992), the relevant test for marginal predictive power will be 
whether the γ coefficients remain significant once the x has been included. The set of 
candidate financial indicators considered in the analysis includes six variables: a real short-
term interest rate (defined as the nominal interest rate, minus the inflation rate over the 
previous year), the depreciation of the real exchange rate (defined as the rate of change in 
the bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the United States, minus the rates of change in the 
respective consumer price indexes), and the rates of change in real reserve money, real 
narrow money, real broad money, and real credit. All rates of change are calculated as 
quarterly log differences. 
The sums of the estimated γs from equation (3), and the F-statistics for their joint exclusion, 
appear in Table 2. (As before, the associated p-values appear in italics, below.) Although the 
table contains a proliferation of numbers, the basic message is quite simple: the inclusion of 
alternative financial variables does little to change the (in-sample) predictive power of stock 
prices. For Korea and Malaysia, the stock price remains highly significant regardless of which 
indicator is included in the forecasting regression. The Thai results are again slightly weaker, 
but the sum of the γs remains significant at the 5 percent level, except for the case in which 
                                                  
7  In the case of Korea, using detrended industrial production instead of its growth rate yields very similar results: 
the stock price coefficients are jointly significant at the 5 percent level, and the coefficient in the four-quarter-
ahead specification is significant at 1 percent. 
8  The results are not qualitatively changed by the exclusion of the 1997–98 period of financial crisis, although 
the statistical significance is somewhat reduced. The possible impact of the crisis period on the results will be 
examined more closely below in the analysis of out-of-sample forecasting performance. 172  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
narrow money is the competitor (and even then, the p-value is 0.056).
9 Similar results are 
obtained using the four-quarter-ahead regression (4) instead of (3), but for brevity, these 
estimates are not reported. The robust statistical significance of the γs suggests that stock 
prices contain information over and above that contained in other, commonly used financial 
indicators. 
As is well known, good in-sample predictive power often fails to translate into an 
improvement in out-of-sample forecasts. Some examination of out-of-sample performance is 
therefore an essential step in determining any indicator’s value in the policy process. The 
procedure used here to gauge that performance is similar to that used elsewhere, e.g., Stock 
and Watson (2001), and involves estimating the forecasting equation (2) up through some 
time period τ, and then calculating the forecast errors from period τ + k through the end of 
the sample.
10 
In order to address, in a limited way, the possible sensitivity of the results to the chosen 
estimation and forecasting periods, three different sets of dates are used. For the first 
exercise, the forecasting regression is estimated on data through 1996Q2 (i.e., the last 
observation forecast is output growth from 1996Q2 through 1997Q2), thus excluding the 
financial crisis that began in the fall of 1997. The forecast evaluation period in this first 
exercise begins with the 1996Q3 observation, and includes the crisis period. In the second 
exercise, the estimation end date and the forecast evaluation start date are both moved up to 
1999Q4 and 2000Q1, respectively, so that the crisis period is included in the estimation, but 
not in the forecast evaluation. The third exercise excludes the crisis period entirely, with an 
estimation end date of 1996Q2 and a forecast evaluation start date of 2000Q1.
11 
The metric used to evaluate forecast performance is the standard one: the forecast root 
mean squared error (RMSE). In order to determine the value added of including the stock 
price in the forecasting equation, the forecast RMSE with the stock price included is 
compared to the RMSE of the forecast generated from (2) with the stock price omitted 
(i.e., with  γ  =  0): if including the stock price improves the out-of-sample forecasting 
performance, then the ratio of the former to the latter will be less than one. 
The results from these forecasting exercises appear in Table 3. The key forecasting metric, 
the ratio of the RMSE from the model with the stock price to that without, is reported in the 
last column of the table. The second-to-last column gives the ratio of the RMSE from the 
model with the stock price to that from a naïve “no change” forecast, i.e., one in which next 
quarter’s output growth rate is forecast to be the same as this quarter’s.
12 
The main findings of these exercises are threefold. First, good in-sample predictive power 
does, to some extent, translate into an improvement in out-of-sample forecasting 
performance. Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand – the three countries for which the stock price 
entered the forecasting regressions significantly – all show a reduction in forecast RMSEs 
when the stock price is included. The same is true for the United States. By contrast, 
including the stock price fails to improve the output forecasts for either the Philippines or 
Indonesia. 
                                                  
9  The one unexpected result in the table is that, in the United States, the stock price is no longer significant 
when real credit is included. 
10  Sometimes, the estimates are updated recursively over the forecast evaluation period, although that is not 
done in this paper’s analysis. 
11  Gaps in the industrial production series limit analysis for Indonesia to an estimation period ending in 1996Q2, 
and a forecast evaluation period starting in 2001Q2. 
12  This ratio of forecast RMSEs is sometimes referred to as Theil’s U statistic. BIS Papers No 39  173
 
 
The second conclusion to be drawn from these exercises is that the inclusion of the stock 
price yields a relatively modest reduction in forecast RMSE: the largest observed is a 7 percent 
improvement in the case of Malaysia, for the case in which the model is estimated on data 
through 1999Q4. This compares with a 12 percent improvement for the United States over 
the same period. In broad terms, these results are similar to those of Stock and 
Watson (2001), who found that the inclusion of asset prices (such as stock prices) yielded 
only small forecasting improvements for the G7 countries.
13 
The third finding to emerge from this analysis is that, while the 1997–98 crisis period may 
have been unusually volatile, it is not anomalous in terms of the link between stock prices 
and output. This conclusion follows from the observation that including this period in the 
sample used to estimate the model leads to a pronounced improvement in forecasting 
performance over the 2000–05 period. Had the crisis been anomalous, in the sense of 
generating spurious shifts in the regression coefficients, its inclusion should have led to a 
deterioration in the forecasts, rather than an improvement.
14 
2.  Stock prices and inflation 
Theoretical links between stock prices and inflation are less direct and more complex than 
they are for stock prices and output. To the extent that a rise in the stock price signals a 
positive demand shock, one would expect such a rise to foretell higher inflation. Similarly, to 
the extent that stock price increases are fueled by “excess liquidity” (a question to be 
explored in section 3) that liquidity might also be expected to generate inflation. But if the 
underlying shock is on the supply side, then the impact on inflation would be precisely the 
opposite. At the same time, the conventional wisdom, reflecting a well-known empirical 
regularity (at least in the United States) is that inflation is bad for stocks.
15 
In the end, of course, the inflationary implications of stock price movements is an empirical 
question, and a methodology similar to the one used in section 1 can be used to assess the 
information content of these movements with regard to future inflation. The results presented 
in this section show that stock prices are even less informative for inflation than they are for 
real output. While this finding might disappoint a forecaster, it is at least consistent with the 
theoretical ambiguity sketched in the preceding paragraph. 
The inflation and stock price fluctuations plotted in Figure  reveal no consistent picture, 
although the 1997–98 financial crisis produced both a sharp drop in equity prices and a spike 
in the inflation rate. This pattern generates in a large, negative contemporaneous correlation 
between the two series in Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, where the coefficients are −0.39, 
−0.31, and −0.45. 
Estimated forecasting equations analogous to those used for real output reveal any 
significant predictive power for stock prices with regard to inflation, however. As shown in 
Table 4, the stock price is generally insignificant in suitably modified equations (1) and (2) in 
which the output growth Δy has been replaced by the inflation rate π. The only exception is 
                                                  
13  Interestingly, the stock price seems to have done a much better job of forecasting real output in the United 
States during this 2000–05 period than it did over the 1985–99 period analyzed in Stock and Watson (2001), 
where the comparable ratio of RMSEs is 2.06. 
14  A generic concern in this sort of analysis is that the measured forecasting power of stock prices can be quite 
sensitive to the choice of sample, as shown by Stock and Watson (2001) for the G7. Unfortunately, data 
constraints do not permit a comparably thorough sensitivity analysis for these five Asian economies. 
15  See, for example, Fama (1981). 174  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
Malaysia, using specification (1), where the joint exclusion of the stock price terms is 
rejected. However, the small size and statistical insignificance of the sum of the coefficients, 
and the lack of a significant γ estimate in equation (2), all suggest that the rejection of the 
exclusion restriction may be spurious. In light of the weak results from the simple 
specifications involving only the stock price and inflation, there is little chance that expanded 
specifications with additional financial indicators would reveal a significant relationship – and 
this suspicion is confirmed by the (unreported) results from estimating suitably modified 
versions of (3) and (4). 
Given the lack of a significant in-sample predictive relationship, it is no surprise that the 
inclusion of equity prices is of no help in improving out-of-sample forecasts. Table 5 reports 
the results of a number of forecasting exercises, similar to those reported earlier for real 
output growth. Again, the key measure of forecasting performance is the ratio of the forecast 
RMSE from a model that includes the stock price to that from one in which the stock price is 
omitted. Also reported is the ratio of the forecast RMSE relative to that from a naïve “no 
change” forecast. A cursory inspection of the table reveals that in no case does the inclusion 
of the stock price lead to a reduction in forecast RMSE, relative to the autoregressive model 
(i.e., a regression of future four-quarter inflation on the current four-quarter inflation rate). In 
fact, the RMSEs from the forecasting model with stock prices are almost uniformly greater 
than those from the “no change” forecast. The underlying reason for this finding is that the 
inflation rate is reasonably well approximated by a random walk; consequently, it is hard for 
any forecasting model to beat the “no change” forecast. Indonesia is the only exception 
(along with the United States), apparently because over the sample considered, there has 
been a distinct tendency for Indonesian inflation to revert to something close to an 8 percent 
annual rate.
16 
Overall, the results for inflation are quite similar qualitatively to those of Stock and Watson (2001) 
for the G7. This does not imply that stock prices bear no relation whatsoever to inflation, of 
course: it is clear from Figure  that, especially during crises, large stock price declines have 
been associated with periods of sharply rising inflation. But purely as a matter of forecasting, 
today’s stock price changes say little about future inflation. 
3.  Liquidity and stock price fluctuations 
Discussions of stock price fluctuations, and what drives them, often focus on the role of 
monetary policy, and the related concept of “liquidity”.
17 In particular, a widely-held view is 
that overly expansionary monetary policy and/or “excess liquidity” is an underlying cause of 
many episodes of asset price appreciation. Examples of this view are not hard to come by. 
Critics of Alan Greenspan, such as Fleckenstein (2005), blame expansionary Federal 
Reserve policy in the late 1990s for a boom in stock prices that appears, in retrospect, to 
have had some features of a bubble.
18 And, with the stock price as a key component of its 
proprietary financial conditions index, Goldman Sachs’ assessment of the economy is 
                                                  
16  In contrast with the findings of Stock and Watson (2001), and other studies looking at earlier periods, the 
model-based forecasts do somewhat better than the “no change” forecasts in the United States during this 
period, which suggests a greater degree of mean reversion in recent years. 
17  Note that this idea is only tangentially related to “liquidity” defined as the ease or speed of consummating 
transactions. 
18  Blinder and Reis (2005) provide a more sympathetic assessment of Greenspan’s response (or lack thereof) to 
the stock market boom of the late 1990s. BIS Papers No 39  175
 
 
significantly influenced by the strength of the equities market.
19 More recently, the business 
and financial press has been awash in articles linking excess liquidity – especially on a global 
scale – to a dangerous escalation in asset prices.
20 
The possible destabilizing effect of expansionary monetary and credit conditions on asset 
markets has also attracted the attention of policymakers in recent years. Borio and Lowe (2002), 
for example, hypothesized that an excessive buildup of credit will inflate asset prices, and 
increase the likelihood of a financial crisis in the future.
21 More recently, strong concerns 
about a “global liquidity glut” and its possible stimulative effect on asset prices, consumption 
and investment have been raised by leading policymakers, such as former IMF research director 
Raghuram Rajan (2006). In a similar vein, Bank of England Governor Mervyn King (2006) 
speculated that buoyant asset markets are “…the result of rapid growth in money and credit 
which, in a “search for yield”, drives asset prices up and interest rates down”. 
Establishing a theoretical link between monetary policy, narrowly defined, and stock prices is 
straightforward. Thinking of the price of a share as the discounted sum of future earnings or 
dividends, a monetary expansion would raise the value of shares through at least two 
channels: first, by reducing the interest rate at which those earnings are discounted; and 
second, by increasing firms’ earnings. While these effects have yet to be modeled in the 
context of a modern New Keynesian framework, the impact of monetary policy on the stock 
market was described, using a dynamic version of the IS-LM model, by Blanchard (1981).
22 
Besides its impact on profits and the risk-free rate, monetary policy may also affect the equity 
premium associated with the share price; indeed, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) showed that 
policy-induced stock price fluctuations in the United States are largely attributable to 
movements in the equity premium.
23 Thus, a link between monetary policy and stock prices 
can be explained in terms of conventional asset pricing principles, without appealing to a 
distinct “liquidity” channel. 
Discussions of “liquidity”, and its economic effects, often refer to effects other than those 
associated with interest rates and earnings. Part of this involves a focus on quantity 
variables, such as money or credit aggregates, as suggested by the Rajan and King remarks. 
This point of view is reminiscent of that of monetarist writers, such as Patinkin (1965) and 
Meltzer (1995), who emphasized the direct effects of quantities on asset prices.
24 This 
channel can be described crudely in terms of supply and demand: as the central bank injects 
liquidity into the economy, agents will try to get rid of it, exchanging money for other assets 
(including equities), thus driving up the price of those assets. 
While this mechanism has a certain intuitive appeal, several conceptual issues require closer 
scrutiny. First, it is not clear why quantity variables would contain more information than the 
                                                  
19  See, for example, Dudley and Hatzius (2000). As of June 2000, the year-ahead real GDP growth forecast from 
Goldman’s financial conditions index was 3½ percent per year, due largely to the strength of the equity 
market. Instead, the economy and the stock market both contracted sharply in the first quarter of 2001. 
20  See, for example, The Economist (2007), Lahart (2006), and Sender (2007); and in the Asian context, 
Liu (2007). Private-sector commentators, such as Wells Capital Management (2007), also often cite liquidity 
as a key driver of equity markets. 
21  Interestingly, Kumar et al. (2003) found no statistically significant role for “global liquidity” in a logit analysis of 
emerging market currency crises. 
22  In Blanchard’s model, profits are a linear function of the level of output, and there is no equity premium. The 
main result is that, as expected, monetary expansions increase the stock price. Whether the stock price 
continues to rise, or subsequently declines, depends on the relative strength of the “profit” versus “discount 
rate” effects. 
23  That is, by reducing the equity premium, monetary expansions also raise equity prices. 
24  See Kuttner and Mosser (2002) for an overview of this “neo-monetarist” view of the transmission mechanism. 176  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
interest rate about the impact of monetary policy on financial markets. Specifically: suppose 
expansionary monetary policy generated an outward shift in the money supply curve, facing 
a downward-sloping money demand curve. In this case, the monetary expansion would be 
evident in both the interest rate and the money supply, and nothing would be gained by 
focusing on the monetary aggregates. 
Quantity variables can, however, reveal useful information about underlying aggregate 
demand shocks, to the extent that those shocks lead to shifts in money demand. As pointed 
out by Friedman (1977), this would be a case in which the quantity of money might 
appropriately be used as an information variable, even though there is no sense in which 
money was the underlying causal factor. Quantity variables could also be informative to the 
extent that the adjustment to the asset market was a gradual one, creating a situation in 
which some measure of monetary “overhang” (such as that implied by “p-star” style models) 
would have some predictive power. 
Another difficult conceptual issue is raised by the assertion that the relevant concept of 
“liquidity” is not adequately captured by conventional measures, such as interest rates and 
monetary aggregates. This view holds that “liquidity” is best defined in terms of investors’ 
willingness to take risks.
25 Links from monetary conditions to this broader notion of “liquidity” 
are often hypothesized, but rarely made explicit. The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report 
(2005), for example, asserts that abundant liquidity encourages financial risk-taking, and 
creates unsustainable valuations. One attempt to model this link theoretically is that of Allen 
and Gale (2000), which shows how the expansion of credit (which is only partially under the 
central bank’s control) can exacerbate the moral hazard issues associated with risky debt.
26 
As a practical matter, however, the problem with this expansive definition of “liquidity” is that 
it can easily become circular: effectively, using rising asset prices (interpreted as a proxy for 
“excess liquidity”) to “explain” rising asset prices.
27 At this point, “liquidity” becomes nothing 
more than a deus ex machina for rationalizing otherwise inexplicable asset price booms. 
In light of these issues, it is worth examining empirically the extent to which increases in 
stock prices are symptomatic of expansionary monetary conditions. (Of necessity, the 
analysis is limited to observable liquidity measures, such as interest rates and money and 
credit aggregates.) Establishing such a link would have important implications for policy, as it 
would strengthen the case for taking into account gauges of financial conditions, such as the 
stock price, in assessing the stance of monetary policy. To anticipate: there is no clear 
statistical link between fluctuations in the various measures of “liquidity” and subsequent 
movements in either output or stock prices. In Korea and Malaysia, however, the evidence 
suggests a connection in the opposite direction, from stock prices to measures of narrow 
money – although this result is sensitive to the inclusion of observations from the 1997–98 
crisis period. 
One approach to characterizing the information content of liquidity measures is simply to 
determine the extent to which those measures help predict real output in a forecasting 
equation like that used in section 1,  
                                                  
25  This view is nicely summarized by Dixon (2007): “…liquidity isn’t just a function of interest rates. It is best 
thought of as a willingness to play the financial game – by lending, borrowing, and betting money. That 
willingness is only partly determined by the cost of money. A bigger part of the story is appetite for risk.” 
Liu (2007) contains a similar definition. 
26  The Allen-Gale story lines up nicely with Dixon’s (2007) description of the collateralized loan obligation market 
and hedge fund industry as enmeshed in a “cat’s cradle of one-way bets”. 
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in which the x variable now represents the proxy for “liquidity”. Instead of the γs, the objects 
of interest are now the θ coefficients. The candidate liquidity proxies are the usual suspects, 
all but one of which appeared in the preceding analysis: the real short-term interest rate; and 
the real growth rates of reserve money, narrow money, broad money, and credit.
28 The new 
addition is the measure of “global excess liquidity” calculated by Rüffer and Stracca (2006), 
which is defined as the difference between broad money and nominal income growth for the 
G5. If expansionary policy (broadly defined) boosts real stock values through an expansion in 
output, as in Blanchard (1981), the impact should translate into significant positive estimates 
of the θs; the same would be true to the extent that liquidity fluctuations contained 
information about unobservable aggregate demand shocks. 
The results in Table 6 uniformly fail to provide support for this view, however. In only one 
case (narrow money, for Korea) is there evidence of a liquidity measure having significant (at 
the 5 percent level) in-sample predictive power for real output. Only in the United States and 
Thailand is there even weak evidence (i.e., significant at the 10 percent level) for 
transmission from either the interest rate or reserve money to real output growth. The lack of 
a significant interest rate effect is somewhat surprising, as the short-term interest rate is 
generally viewed as the central bank’s primary (if not its only) policy instrument. A critically 
important caveat, however, is that the interest rate is endogenous with respect to the state of 
the economy. While it may be true that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the real interest rate is 
contractionary, central banks tend to raise the rate as the economy expands.
29 Reduced-
form regressions like (5) could therefore fail to capture the true impact of policy actions. For 
this reason, the results in Table 6 should be interpreted with caution. 
Another simple way to characterize the links (if any) between “liquidity” and stock prices is 
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In this framework, one estimate of interest would be the influence (in a predictive sense) of 
“liquidity” on stock prices, as captured by the θ
s coefficients. Also interesting is the predictive 
power of stock prices for liquidity, as captured by the γ
s coefficients: non-zero estimates 
would be suggestive of some mechanism in which stock prices drove liquidity, rather than the 
other way around. As before, quarterly dummies are included to capture seasonal patterns.
30 
The Granger causality tests calculated from estimates of equation (6) appear in Table 7. 
Overall, there is no clear pattern of “liquidity” Granger-causing stock prices: the exclusion of 
the liquidity terms in the stock price equation is rejected at the 5 percent level only for credit 
                                                  
28  Although the distinction is not central to this paper’s analysis, it is worth noting that some of these variables, 
such as the real interest rate or reserve money, are, at least in principle, under the central bank’s control; 
while others, such as broad money or credit, are not. 
29  See Kuttner and Mosser (2002) for a further discussion of this point. 
30  The lag length has been reduced from four to two on the assumption that there should be less of a lag in the 
response of “liquidity” to stock prices, and vice versa, than there would be for real output and inflation. The 
results are generally similar with four lags, but weaker in terms of statistical significance. 178  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
in the United States, and the real interest rate in Thailand.
31 Nor is there any evidence for a 
role for “global excess liquidity” in driving stock prices, in either Asia or the United States. 
Again, some caution is warranted in interpreting the results, since the Granger causality 
approach ignores the possibility of a contemporaneous impact on stock prices. In addition, to 
the extent that equity markets are efficient, surprise changes in policy are likely to have a 
larger effect on stock prices than the “old news” embodied in lagged liquidity measures.
32 
The negative test results nonetheless indicate that run-ups in stock prices are not 
systematically preceded by increases in liquidity. In this regard, the results corroborate those 
of Posen (2003), who, using completely different methods, found no consistent tendency for 
asset price booms to be preceded by monetary easing. 
The evidence is slightly stronger for causality running from stock prices to liquidity. Here, the 
exclusion restrictions corresponding to no causality are strongly rejected, at the 5 percent 
level or better, for reserve and narrow money in Korea and Malaysia – intriguingly, the two 
Asian countries in the sample in which stock prices had significant predictive power for real 
output. Stock prices also Granger-cause narrow money in the United States, and, with a 
p-value of 0.055, the stock price terms are almost significant in the interest rate equation. In 
this regard, there would appear to be a similarity between Korea, Malaysia and the United 
States. 
There is one critical difference, however. In the United States, the (unreported) coefficients 
on the stock price in the narrow money equation are negative, and those in the interest rate 
equation are positive, consistent with a contractionary response to rising stock prices.
33 In 
Korea and Malaysia, on the other hand, the coefficients on the stock price in the money 
equation are positive, which suggests an expansionary response to rising stock prices – or 
equivalently, a contractionary response to falling stock prices. This particular result turns out 
to be sensitive to the inclusion of the 1997–98 crisis period; the stock price terms are 
insignificant when that period is excluded. Presumably, this is because the crisis, which first 
precipitated a collapse in equity prices, also led central banks to conduct a more 
contractionary monetary policy in an effort to stabilize the currency. 
Overall, the results presented in this section fail to clearly establish a consistent link in either 
direction between stock prices and observable measures of “liquidity”. Needless to say, 
these results do not imply that there is no connection with monetary policy: for all the reasons 
discussed above, there is good reason to believe that, ceteris paribus, an (unexpected) 
change in the interest rate set by the monetary authority will have an impact on the prices of 
assets, including equities. But it is going to take more than just a series of surprise interest 
rate cuts for monetary policy to generate a sustained, bubble-like rise in equity prices – that 
would require a change in the perceived rule being used to conduct policy, which, in turn, 
should manifest itself in the behavior of interest rates and/or quantity variables. No such 
relationship is evident in the data. 
                                                  
31  This rejection rate of 0.055 is roughly what one would expect if the null hypothesis of no relationship were true, 
assuming the tests were independent of one another. 
32  For evidence supporting this view, see Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). 
33  This does not necessarily imply that the Federal Reserve is responding to stock prices per se, as the 




The main purpose of this study has been to discuss the possible role for equity prices as a 
leading economic indicator, and to assess empirically the usefulness of stock price data in an 
Asian emerging market context. One broad conclusion from the analysis in the paper is that 
the information content of stock prices varies a great deal across countries. Equity prices in 
Korea, Malaysia, and to a somewhat lesser extent, Thailand, seem to be closely linked to the 
macroeconomy – but much less so in the Philippines and Indonesia. 
Even for Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, where the stock price is a good in-sample predictor 
of output, including the stock price yields only modest improvements in out-of-sample 
forecasting performance. The results for these three countries are very similar to those for 
the United States, where the stock price is a useful – but somewhat unreliable – leading 
indicator. 
The key finding of section 2 is that Asian equity prices fail to display a systematic relationship, 
either in sample or out of sample, with inflation. In large part this is because, over the sample 
used in the analysis, inflation resembles a random walk, and consequently it is hard to do 
better than a naïve “no change” forecast. Again, the results for Asia are similar to those for 
the United States presented in this paper, and in other published research. 
The relationship between “liquidity”, stock prices, and the economy, discussed at length in 
section 3, is a complex one. The main conclusion from that discussion is that, while there are 
sound theoretical reasons for monetary policy to have an effect on equity valuations, the role 
of broader and more nebulous “liquidity” concepts is not well motivated; nor is it clear exactly 
how “excess liquidity” promotes financial risk-taking. As a practical matter, it turns out none 
of the liquidity measures considered in the analysis has any significant predictive power for 
either real output or stock prices, calling into question the popular view that “liquidity” (or at 
least observable proxies for it) is an important driving force in either financial markets or the 





Industrial production. For Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, the source is the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. For Thailand, 
the source is the Bank of Thailand, and US data were obtained from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Saint Louis FRED database. Adjustments were made to correct for the 
discontinuities in the series for Malaysia in May 1988 and January 1991, and in the series for 
Indonesia in January 2003. 
Consumer prices. For the five Asian countries, the source is the IFS database. US data were 
obtained from the FRED database. 
Money and credit. For all countries, the money and credit series are from the IFS database. 
Reserve money is from the data on Monetary Authorities (line 14). For every country except 
Malaysia, data from the Monetary Survey is used for narrow money, broad money, and credit 
(lines 34, 35 and 32). National definitions of money are used for Malaysia. Adjustments were 
made to correct for the discontinuities in the series for Malaysia in January 1990 and 
January  1992, and in the series for the Philippines in 2003Q3. Y2K-related spikes were 
removed from the money series for Malaysia and Thailand. 
Interest rates. For the five Asian countries, short-term interest rates (typically the money 
market rate) are taken from the IFS database. The short-term rate for the United States is the 
federal funds rate, obtained from the FRED database. 
Stock prices. All stock price indexes are from MSCI/Barra, and obtained from 
http://www.mscibarra.com/. 
Global excess liquidity. The data, as described in Rüffer and Stracca (2006), were obtained 





In-sample predictive power of stock price for real output, no controls 
 One-quarter-ahead  model 
 
Number of 
observations  Sum of coeffs Exclusion test
Stock price coefficient, 
four-quarter-ahead 
model 
0.133 3.949  0.152 
Korea 72 
0.007 0.007  0.002 
0.206 5.791  0.226 
Malaysia 72 
0.000 0.001  0.000 
0.015 0.836  0.031 
Philippines 72 
0.849 0.508  0.716 
0.140 2.003  0.109 
Thailand 72 
0.009  0.106  0.026 
0.056 0.241  0.093 
Indonesia 53 
0.445 0.914  0.342 
0.081 5.990  0.200 
United States  72 
0.003 0.000  0.006 
Notes: the one-quarter-ahead forecasting model is given by equation (1) in the text, and the four-quarter-ahead 
model is given by equation (2). For each country, the number in the first row under the “Sum of coeffs” column 
gives the sum of the estimated γ coefficients, and the number under the “Exclusion test” column gives the 
F-statistic for the exclusion of the four coefficients. P-values for the hypotheses that the sum equals zero, and 
that the γs are jointly zero, appear below, in italics. For the four-quarter-ahead model, the table gives the 
estimated γ, and the p-value for the hypothesis that it is equal to zero; standard errors are corrected for MA(3) 



























In-sample predictive power of stock price for real output, including other financial variables 
  Real rate  Real depreciation  Reserve money  Narrow money  Broad money  Credit 
  Sum Excl. Sum Excl. Sum Excl. Sum Excl. Sum Excl. Sum Excl. 
0.181 6.421  0.127 4.295 0.117 3.753  0.122 3.872 0.141 4.115 0.118 3.121 
Korea 
0.001 0.000  0.008 0.004 0.030 0.009  0.013 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.028 0.022 
0.216 5.076  0.172 3.699 0.213 4.715  0.254 5.121 0.208 5.179 0.195 4.747 
Malaysia 
0.001 0.002  0.004 0.010 0.000 0.002  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
–0.012 0.413  –0.047 0.601 0.001 1.011  –0.022 1.518 0.011 0.534 0.039 0.526 
Philippines 
0.879 0.798  0.651 0.664 0.994 0.409  0.766 0.209 0.887 0.711 0.656 0.717 
0.113 1.137  0.121 1.778 0.138 1.771  0.107 1.787 0.144 1.928 0.140 1.869 
Thailand 
0.043  0.349  0.015  0.146  0.012  0.148 0.056  0.144 0.010  0.118  0.011  0.129 
0.099 0.703  0.056 0.316 0.053 0.299  0.043 0.073 0.040 0.187 0.026 0.101 
Indonesia 
0.265 0.595  0.460 0.865 0.470 0.877  0.683 0.990 0.640 0.944 0.777 0.981 
0.102 6.215  0.079 5.362 0.107 7.423  0.089 6.094 0.078 4.679 0.027 1.271 
United States 
0.001 0.000  0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002  0.000 0.005 0.002 0.443 0.292 
Notes: the results are based on the one-quarter-ahead forecasting model given by equation (3) in the text. For each country, the number in the first row under the “Sum” 
column gives the sum of the estimated γ coefficients, and the number under the “Excl.” column gives the F-statistic for the exclusion of the four coefficients. P-values for the 
hypotheses that the sum equals zero, and that the γs are jointly zero, appear below, in italics. Boldface type is used to highlight results that are significant at the 5 percent 
level or better.  




Out-of-sample forecasting performance for real output 




period  Start End 
RMSE 
“No change”  No stock 
price 
1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    7.94  0.61   0.99 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    3.38  0.39   0.95  Korea 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    3.18  0.37   0.98 
1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    9.14  0.70   0.96 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    6.61  0.60   0.93  Malaysia 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    7.92  0.72   0.97 
1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    10.74  0.90   1.04 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    8.39  0.71   1.00  Philippines 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    10.37  0.88   1.01 
1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    7.76  0.78   0.99 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    3.60  0.73   0.94  Thailand 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    3.81  0.77   0.99 
Indonesia 1996Q2  2001Q2  2005Q1    16.56   2.13   1.00 
1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    3.21  0.87   1.08 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    3.10  0.71   0.88  United 
States 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    3.24  0.74   0.98 
Notes: the results are based on equation (2), estimated from 1988Q1 to the indicated periods. RMSE denotes 
the forecast root mean squared error. The ratios of this RMSE to that of the naïve “no change” forecast, and to 
that of the model with no stock price, appear in the final two columns. Boldface type is used to highlight 
reductions in forecast RMSE.  





In-sample predictive power of stock price for inflation, no controls 









–0.006 1.161  –0.012 
Korea 72 
0.440  0.337  0.089 
–0.003 4.547  –0.007 
Malaysia 72 
0.179  0.003  0.200 
–0.005 1.407  –0.009 
Philippines 72 
0.121  0.242  0.095 
–0.001 0.152  –0.002 
Thailand 72 
0.845  0.961  0.812 
–0.002 1.005  –0.012 
Indonesia 72 
0.338  0.412  0.270 
0.002 1.211 0.006 
United States  75 
0.253  0.315  0.255 
Notes: see notes to Table 1. 
  





Out-of-sample forecasting performance for inflation 










1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    2.67    1.01    1.01 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    1.84    1.43    1.10  Korea 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    2.18    1.70    1.04 
1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    1.50    1.00    1.00 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    1.76    2.02    1.06  Malaysia 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    1.46    1.68    1.04 
1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    4.93    1.19    1.11 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    2.56   0.71   1.00  Philippines 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    4.25    1.17    1.13 
1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    3.20    1.00    1.01 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    2.61    1.68    1.03  Thailand 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    2.86    1.84    1.01 
1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    15.33   0.74   1.01 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    4.49   0.80   1.09  Indonesia 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    3.76   0.67   1.00 
1996Q2 1996Q3 2005Q4    0.94   0.91   1.03 
1999Q4 2000Q1 2005Q4    0.97   0.91   1.06  United 
States 
1996Q2 2000Q1 2005Q4    0.99   0.92   1.05 


























In-sample predictive power of liquidity measures for real output 
  Real rate  Reserve money  Narrow money  Broad money  Credit  Global liquidity 
  Sum Excl. Sum Excl. Sum Excl. Sum Excl. Sum Excl. Sum Excl. 
0.113 1.868  0.000 0.526  0.000 3.447  0.000 1.655  –0.000 1.621  0.767 0.603 
Korea 
0.312  0.129  0.388  0.717  0.738  0.014  0.297  0.173  0.567  0.182  0.408  0.662 
0.146 1.041  –0.000 1.123  –0.000 0.654  –0.000 0.470  –0.000 1.623  –0.063 0.568 
Malaysia 
0.523  0.394  0.217  0.355  0.183  0.627  0.253  0.758  0.271  0.181  0.944  0.687 
0.073 0.396  0.078 0.896  0.120 0.659  0.039 0.438  0.009 0.224  –2.792 0.995 
Philippines 
0.737 0.811  0.454 0.473  0.346 0.623  0.268 0.781  0.586 0.924  0.113 0.418 
–0.069 2.085  –0.029 2.276  0.041 0.851  0.006 0.187  –0.003 0.613  1.636 1.232 
Thailand 
0.562  0.095 0.478  0.072 0.469  0.499 0.596  0.944 0.252  0.655 0.080  0.308 
0.160 0.439  0.000 0.707  –0.000 0.211  0.000 0.480  0.000 0.180  –3.341 1.412 
Indonesia 
0.572 0.780  0.782 0.592  0.866 0.931  0.553 0.751  0.746 0.947  0.164 0.249 
–0.093 0.761  0.072 2.049  0.013 0.477  0.001 0.604  0.002 1.458  –0.265 1.592 
United States 
0.102  0.555  0.055  0.099  0.273  0.753  0.811  0.661  0.185  0.227  0.337 0.188 




























Granger causality tests for real stock prices and liquidity 
  x = Real rate  x = Reserve money x = Narrow money  x = Broad money  x = Credit  x = “Global liquidity” 
  s → x  x → s  s → x  x → s  s → x  x → s  s → x  x → s  s → x  x → s  s → x  x → s 
0.011 2.042 4.040  0.051  4.620  0.672 1.446 0.025 1.094 0.022 2.226 1.100 
Korea 
0.989  0.138  0.022  0.950  0.013  0.514  0.243  0.975  0.341  0.979  0.116  0.339 
2.063 1.094 7.744  0.330  5.558  0.248 0.678 1.836 1.229 2.518 3.394  0.981 
Malaysia 
0.135  0.341  0.001  0.720  0.006  0.781  0.511  0.167  0.299  0.088  0.040  0.380 
1.458 1.477 0.476 0.397 0.320 0.126 1.219 0.009 3.031 0.802 2.108 0.018 
Philippines 
0.240 0.236 0.624 0.674 0.727 0.882 0.302 0.991 0.055 0.453 0.130 0.982 
0.912  3.407  0.248 0.835 0.002 0.495 2.541 0.128 1.109 0.402 0.424 0.338 
Thailand 
0.407  0.039  0.781  0.438 0.998 0.612 0.087 0.880 0.336  0.670 0.656  0.715 
0.560 1.683 0.342 0.958 1.460 1.485 0.641 1.573 0.440 1.457 0.060 0.639 
Indonesia 
0.574 0.194 0.712 0.389 0.240 0.234 0.530 0.215 0.646 0.240 0.942 0.531 
3.022 0.428 0.539 0.084 3.720  0.456 2.822 1.028 1.920 3.208 4.547 0.784 
United States 
0.055  0.654  0.586  0.920  0.029  0.635  0.066  0.363  0.154  0.047 0.014 0.461 
Notes: the results are based on the VAR given by equation (6) in the text. For each country, the number in the first row under the “s → x” column gives the F-statistic for the 
exclusion of the four stock price coefficients in the “liquidity” equation; the numbers in the “x → s” columns are those for the exclusion of the “liquidity” proxy in the stock price 







































































































Stock price and industrial production growth 
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Stock price growth and inflation 
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